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I. Independence of the Constitutional Court 
● constitutional status 
     In Romania, the Constitutional Court is the guarantor for the supremacy of the 
Constitutional and the only authority of constitutional jurisdiction. The 
Constitutional Court is independent of any public authority, subject only to the 
Constitution1 and to its organic law2.  
 
● regulatory autonomy with respect to the rules of procedure 
 The rules of procedure governing the activity of constitutional jurisdiction are 
provided in the law of organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court3 
and are supplemented by the rules of civil procedure, to the extent to which they 
                                                 
1
 The Constitution of Romania, in its initial wording, was adopted in the session of the Constituent 
Assembly on November 21, 1991, in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 233 of November 21, 
1991 and became effective after its approval by the national referendum of December 8, 1991. The Law for 
the revision of the Constitution of Romania, no. 429/2003, was approved by the national referendum of 
October 18-19, 2003 and became effective on October 29, 2003, day of publication in the Official Gazette 
of Romania, Part I, no. 758 of October 29, 2003 of the Constitutional Court Ruling no. 3 of October 22, 
2003 confirming the results of the national referendum of October 18-19, 2003 on the Law for the revision 
of the Constitution. 
2
 Law no. 47/1992 on the organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court was republished in the 
Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 643 of July 16, 2004  
3
 Article 14 and Chapter V, denominated Procedural rules specific to the activity of the Constitutional 
Court, of Law no. 47/1992, above-cited 
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are compatible with the nature of the proceedings before the Constitutional 
Court.      
The compatibility shall be decided exclusively by the Constitutional Court. It is 
worth stressing that the rules of procedure that apply to contentious 
constitutional are regulated by the law of organisation and functioning, but the 
Constitutional Court has autonomy in the assessment of compatibility of civil 
procedure rules with the specificity of the contentious constitutional.  
 
● independent budget 
     The Constitutional Court does have autonomy in setting its own budget. The 
Constitutional Court has its own budget which is an integral part of the State 
budget. The draft of the budget is approved by the Plenary of the Constitutional 
Court, and it is forwarded to the Government in order to be distinctively included 
in the State budget to be legislated4. 
 
● administrative autonomy 
    From the administrative point of view, the activity is carried out according to 
the Law on the structure of the Constitutional Court personnel5 and the Standing 
Rules on organisation and functioning of the Constitutional Court6. On the basis of 
its functional autonomy, by its standing rules, the Plenary of the Court establishes 
the responsibilities and specific rules of activity, the organisation and operation of 
administrative staff departments, as well as disciplinary rules and disciplinary 
liability. The Plenary of the Court adopts its own rules and regulations, in 
compliance with the legal provisions. The Plenary approves: the organisational 
structure, as well as the classification of posts, according to the law, it organises 
and validates the results of contests for the position of assistant magistrate and the 
results of the junior assistant-magistrates capacity examination; it establishes the 
terms of equivalence as regards the personnel from the Court's structure; it takes 
any necessary measure in order to apply the law and to ensure the smooth 
operation of the Court.   
 
● disciplinary independence 
     The Constitutional Court has full autonomy for finding any violations 
committed by judges and for applying sanctions. 




                                                 
4
 Article 75 of Law no. 47/1992, cited above 
5
 Law no. 124 of July 13, 2000, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 331 of July 17, 
2000. 
6
 Approved by Ruling no. 2 of January 28, 2005 of the Plenary of the Constitutional Court and published in 
the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 116 of February 4, 2005.  
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● compliance with Court decisions.  
    Currently, the independence of the Constitutional Court results also from the 
fact that its decisions are final, generally binding and effective only for the future7. 
In this context it is worth noting that prior to the 2003 constitutional revision, with 
a majority of two thirds, the Parliament could invalidate the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court, but such ever occurred. 
 
    As a general rule, the Constitutional Court's decisions are observed by the 
authorities. However, sometimes, the legislator includes in the contents of the new 
regulations some legislative solutions declared unconstitutional, but this rather 
means that it does not observe a constitutional impediment than the fact that it 
disregards the Constitutional Court decisions. In this regard, we exemplify 
Decision no.12578 of October 7/2009, by which were declared unconstitutional the 
provisions of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 37 of April 22, 2009 on 
measures to improve the activity of public administration9. Subsequently, the 
regulations and legislative solutions declared unconstitutional were included in the 
contents of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 105 of October 6, 2009 on 
some measures in the field of civil service, as well as for strengthening managerial 
capacity at the level of the decentralized public services of ministries and other 
central government bodies within the administrative-territorial units and of other 
public services, as well as for setting some measures concerning the office of the 
official within the central and local government bodies, the office of the prefect 
and the office of the local elected official10. By Decision11 no. 1629 of December 
3/2009 also the provisions of this ordinance were declared unconstitutional. The 
same legal provisions, declared unconstitutional in two occasions, were again 
included in the Law amending and supplementing Law no. 188/1999 on the status 
of public servants. Ruling within the a priori review, the Constitutional Court 
found that also in the newly adopted legislation were included the legislative 
solutions previously declared unconstitutional, which is why also this time the law 
was declared unconstitutional12. 
 
● relationship with the media.  
    Every decision has a potential of discontent from those for whom it was 
unfavourable. Relationship with the media is a sensitive issue. Rather critical than 
approving, the media reflects the activity of the Constitutional Court, with special 
reference to the decisions that have a social, economic or political impact (we 
consider the decisions on the restitution of properties nationalised by the former 
                                                 
7
 Article 147 of the Constitution. 
8
 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 758 of November 6, 2009.  
9
 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 264 of April 22, 2009.  
10
 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 668 of October 6, 2009.  
11
 Published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, no. 28 of January 14, 2010. 
12
 Decision no.414 of April 14, 2010, published in the Official Gazette, Part I no. 291 of May 4, 2010 
 4 
communist regime, the advisory opinion on the suspension of the President of 
Romania, the cutting of pensions and wages, etc.). 
 
II. The constitutional independence of judges 
 
● protection from promotional “temptation” 
     During the term of office of constitutional judge no promotion to another office 
is possible. The only office is that of President, who, however, is elected by secret 
ballot, by the other judges for a three year term of office (Article 142 paragraph 3 
of the Constitution). If the President were appointed by one of the authorities, a 
temptation to have a good relationship with that authority, in view of appointment 
to the office, might have occurred, and that would have been likely to undermine 
the very independence of the president. 
    
● age criterion in assessing the judge’s independence 
     Age may be a factor in assessing the independence of the constitutional judge, 
but obviously only in systems in which the term of office has a fixed period. 
Completion of the term near to the retirement age provides additional guarantees 
of independence, unlike cases where the mandate is completed during professional 
career, with the desire to carry also other offices in the future. In Romania, the 
nine year term of office may cease even at the age of 49 years, long before the 
legal retirement age.    
 
● wage level, a protection factor for the judge 
 
    The category of economic measures for the protection of the constitutional 
judge comprises the following: salary; subsistence allowance; end-of-service 
allowance and service pension.  
 
   The wages of a constitutional judge must be such as to assure him/her, on the 
one hand, a decent standard of living, and on the other hand, the financial 
independence that would put him/her away from any other temptations. 
 
   In Romania, constitutional judges do not have their own status with respect to 
wages, but they are remunerated by reference to the salaries of judges of the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice. Thus, the President of the Constitutional Court is 
equal in rank to the President of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, and the 
Constitutional Court judges are equal in rank to the Vice-President of the High 
Court of Cassation and Justice, and they benefit of equal indemnity as these ones, 
increased with 15%, as well as of any other rights (Article 70 of Law no. 47/1992). 
 
    Subsistence allowance. Judges who are not domiciled in the Municipality of 
Bucharest, where the seat of the Constitutional Court is located, are entitled to free 
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accommodation, weekly transportation to and from their respective locality of 
residence, as well as to a per diem allowance for the days in which they participate 
in the proceedings of the Constitutional Court, under the same conditions as 
stipulated by law with regard to Deputies and Senators. (Article 71 of Law no. 
47/1992).   
 
    End-of-service allowance. Upon cessation of the mandate as a result of the 
expiration of the term of office, or incapacity to exercise office for health reasons, 
the Judges of the Constitutional Court benefit of an amount equal to the net 
indemnity for six months of activity. 
 
    Service pension. On the date of retirement or recalculation of pensions as have 
been established up to that time, the Judges of the Constitutional Court benefit of a 
service pension which amount equals 80% of their monthly gross indemnity. The 
pension established in this way shall be updated in relation with the indemnity of 
the Constitutional Court Judges and shall be taxed according to the law (Article 72 
of Law no. 47/1992).  
 
    It is worth mentioning also that by the Law establishing some measures on 
pensions, law adopted following the Government's assumption of responsibility 
before the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, in the joint session of June 7, 
2010, the service pensions of judges, prosecutors and Constitutional Court judges, 
respectively assistant-magistrates were integrated into the public pension system 
and other social insurance rights, being substantially cut. Basically with these legal 
provisions were eliminated the service pensions of judges, in terms of amount 
thereof. Ruling within the a priori review, the Constitutional Court held that 
judicial independence include also financial security of magistrates, which 
involves providing a social security such as the service pension. Consequently, the 
criticized legal provisions were declared unconstitutional13, magistrates and 
constitutional judges being further entitled to service pension. 
 
● fixed term of office, a guarantee for the judge’s independence  
 
    We consider that the constitutional provision concerning the term of office of 
Constitutional Court judges is a guarantee for the judge’s independence. This is 
because, according to Article 142 paragraph 2 of the Constitution, judges are 
"appointed for a term of office of nine years, which can not be prolonged or 
renewed." If it were possible to reinvest the judge for another term of office, we 
could question his/her possible desire to be reinvested and his/her behaviour in 
relation to the authority entitled to make such decision.       
 
                                                 
13
 Decision no. 873 of June 25, 2010, published in the Official Gazette no. 433 of June 28, 2010. 
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● incompatibility of the mandate of a constitutional judge with any other function  
     According to the provisions of Article 144 of the Constitution, the office of a 
Judge at Constitutional Court is incompatible with any other public or private 
office, except that of academic professorial activity. We think that this is good 
compatibility between constitutional jurisdiction, higher legal education and 
research in the field. 
 
● cases of removal from office of a constitutional court judge 
 
    The mandate of constitutional judge may cease, by Ruling of the Plenary of the 
Constitutional Court, adopted by majority vote of the judges14.  
In this respect, the Plenary of the Court may decide:  
- in situations of incompatibility, or of impossibility of exercising the office of 
Judge for a period which is longer than six months; 
- in case of loss of Romanian citizenship or change of residence abroad;  
- if the judge becomes a member of a political party, 
- for the severe infringement of the obligations incumbent on a judge (a judge has 
the following obligations: to perform the function of judge unbiasedly and in 
abidance by the Constitution; to keep the secret of the deliberations and of the 
votes, and not to take a public stand, or to give legal opinion in matters within the 
competence of the Constitutional Court; to express the affirmative or negative vote 
in adopting the acts of the Constitutional Court, abstention from voting not being 
permitted; to impart to the President of the Constitutional Court any activity which 
might entail incompatibility with the mandate exercised; to preclude the use of the 
office performed for purposes of trade publicity or propaganda of any kind 
whatsoever; to abstain from any activity or manifestation contrary to the 
independence or dignity of their office15.)   
 
● immunity of the constitutional judge 
    According to Article 145 of the Constitution, Judges of the Constitutional Court 
are independent in the exercise of their office and irremovable during their term of 
office. 
The Judges of the Constitutional Court cannot be held legally responsible for their 
opinions and for the votes cast in rendering the decisions16. 
 
III. Operating procedures of courts                                                          
    The political majority does not question the constitutionality of laws which it 
adopts, even if the presumption of constitutionality is relative. But the political 
majority questions the constitutionality of laws passed by the former majority. 
Irrespective of the time of adoption of the law, its unconstitutionality creates 
                                                 
14
  Article 67 paragraph 2 of Law no. 47//1992, cited above 
15
  Article 64 of Law no. 47/1992, cited above 
16
 Article 61 paragraph 2) of Law no. 47/1992, cited above 
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obligations for the majority in office, which must bring into accord the legal 
provisions declared unconstitutional with the provisions of the Constitution.   
        
     The Constitutional Court of Romania examines the constitutionality of laws, 
both within the a priori review and within the a posteriori review. Disquiet of the 
government is more evident when the law is found unconstitutional within the a 
priori review. Even if for the moment, the authorities are unhappy, then they 
comply with the decision of the Court. 
 
     The Constitutional Court adjudicates only on the constitutionality of the acts in 
regard of which it has been apprised, and it is not be competent to modify or to 
supplement the provisions under review (Article 2 paragraph 3 of Law no. 
47/1992). If the exception is admitted, the Court shall also pronounce upon the 
constitutionality of other provisions of the normative act being challenged, of 
which those mentioned in the case referral act cannot obviously and necessarily be 
dissociated (Article 31 paragraph 2 of Law no. 47/1992).  
 
     The Constitutional Court adjudicates on the objections or referrals of 
unconstitutionality, even if their authors decide to waive the contentious 
constitutional procedure or to withdraw the objection. In both cases, continuation 
of the procedures can be regarded as an element of independence of the Court, and 
moreover as its obligation to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution. 
 
     The Constitutional Court adjudicates on the constitutionality of laws and 
ordinances of the Government, legislation in force. Recently, the Court also ruled 
on the constitutionality of laws repealing other legislation. If in the first case, after 
publication in the Official Gazette of the decision establishing the 
unconstitutionality, the Parliament or the Government, as may be applicable, have 
the obligation to bring those unconstitutional provisions into accord with those of 
the Constitution, within 45 days, in the second case that obligation does no longer 
exist, because the legal provisions that were subject to repeal are brought into 
force by the effect of the Court decision. In such a case, the legislator's margin of 
appreciation must observe such decision, because a legislative solution declared 
unconstitutional can not be reproduced by any other normative act. 
  
     In contentious constitutional, omission of the law is a ground of inadmissibility 
of the referral of unconstitutionality. To the extent that the legal vacuum relates to 
constitutional rules and principles, we consider that the limitation of the powers of 
the court as guarantor for the supremacy of the Constitution, becomes 
questionable. 
 
    Dissenting or concurring opinions are published in the Official Gazette together 
with the decision. Inevitably, the opinion’s author exposes himself/herself to 
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criticism or appreciation, but his/her independence is not affected whereas he/she 
benefits of specific constitutional safeguards. 
 
      Preservation of confidentiality with respect to the name of the rapporteur 
member can be achieved even if the access to the archive is not banned. 
Confidentiality of the rapporteur member and of deliberations are means of 
protection of the constitutional judge. Confidentiality of the proceedings can be 
correlated with the possibility to formulate and publish dissenting opinions. 
 
  
